Vogter Faced Some Tough Challenges
Stephen Vogt may win manager of the year for the American League in 2024, but did he have a bad playoffs?
With a little time to reflect, I want to offer some analysis of five big decisions Vogt had to make in the 2024 playoffs. I will provide a little in the way of conversational responses to a recent article from FanGraphs’ Ben Clemens who recently offered a managerial report card for Vogt’s performance in the ALDS and ALCS. The usual caveat applies: none of us know exactly what kind of inside information Vogt was provided on Guardians’ players and on their opponents.
First Decision: Bullpen usage, especially in game one and game five of the ALDS
Analysis: We knew – because the Guardians were open about it – that Vogt was going to go to his top four bullpen arms – Emmanuel Clase, Cade Smith, Hunter Gaddis and Tim Herrin – early and often in the playoffs. Vogt had two reliable starting pitchers – Tanner Bibee and Matthew Boyd – and the best bullpen in baseball, so this made sense. However, as Clemens noted in his article and as I pointed out before the playoffs began, the reliever familiarity effect is a real factor. Almost as much as hitters improve against starting pitchers third-time-through-the-order, they also improve after seeing the same relievers multiple times in a short period of time. We saw this phenomenon in the ALDS and ALCS unfold before our eyes from both sides, multiple times. So, Clemens dings Vogt for going to his top bullpen guys in game one of the ALDS when Cleveland opened up a five-run lead, and he dings him for removing Boyd after two strong innings in game five.
I understand why Vogt did what he did, both times. He was going for the jugular, extinguishing all hope for the Tigers. You can’t lose a game because you left Cade Smith and Emmanuel Clase sitting in your bullpen. I think it’s fair, however, to ask that Vogt and the Guardians place a little more emphasis on limiting the opposition’s reps with their best relief arms as well as limiting the stress placed on those relievers in multiple high-pressure appearances in a week. Smith, in particular, looked absolutely gassed by the end of the ALCS. It made sense to me to not use him in game four of the ALCS after he was so down in velocity in game three, so that seemed like a mistake when Smith entered and was, again, off his game. The biggest factor I feel like Vogt perhaps failed to rely on was the strength of his secondary arms. I think there were reasons to trust Eli Morgan and Erik Sabrowski more in the ALDS and ALCS and Pedro Avila more in the ALCS. I think Andrew Walters is a remarkable talent after he got some rookie jitters out of the way. Would it have made a difference in reducing the reliever familiarity effect and arm freshness to give some of these arms the reps that Smith, Herrin, Gaddis or Clase got in the ALDS game one, ALDS game five, and ALCS game four? I think it’s fair to wonder, but I also think this is mostly hindsight is 20/20 stuff, from Clemens and from me.
What Vogt did made sense in terms of balancing going for the jugular with not running his best arms into the ground in the moment. The two biggest mistakes were not letting Boyd continue to go for four or five innings when he was rolling in game five of the ALDS (because of wear-and-tear on your best arms) and having Erik Sabrowski pitch back-to-back games in the ALCS when he had not done so all season. And, only the Sabrowski decision continues to rankle me. The issues Vogt’s relievers faced were more likely due to the amount of innings they had to cover midseason, poor pitch selection at times and simple poor execution at others, and the Yankees and Tigers hitters just performing when it counted/getting some good BABIP luck (not saying they won because they were lucky AT ALL, just that some of the broken bat/bloop hits helped as they inevitably will for some team).
Incidentally, Clemens for some reason references Gaddis’s 2023 stats from when he was a starter. This is silly. Gaddis was one of the most dominant relievers in baseball in 2024 as a reliever and Vogt trusting him to face great hitters is entirely understandable.
Bringing Joey Cantillo into game one with the bases loaded at Yankee Stadium in the ALCS was also a mistake. I get the concept, but it was a much better idea to have Erik Sabrowski or Tim Herrin warming there to get you out of trouble and then go to Cantillo for length. It’s also not hindsight here; I’m confident many of us were thinking the same thing the moment Cantillo took the mound.
Overall, I give Vogt a B grade for how he handled pitching. I hope the organization can spend to get better starting pitching in 2025 and re-evaluate their approach to the reliever familiarity effect if they are fortunate enough to make the playoffs again next year.
Second Decision: Pinch-Hitting/Lineup Strategy
Analysis: There were questions about whether or not A.J. Hinch had outsmarted Vogt by getting him to pinch-hit for his left-handed hitters after a Montero opener in game three of the ALDS was abruptly circumvented by a Brant Hurter substitution, prompting Vogt to burn his bench getting David Fry and Jhonkensy Noel into the game. I think this was the right move by Vogt because both players entered with a chance to make a huge impact on the game; it just didn’t pan out because neither came through. There were questions on whether or not Daniel Schneemann should have made multiple starts in right-field in the ALCS, but I’m going to give Vogt a pass there because he was clearly trying to maximize Jhonkensy Noel’s chances at success by giving him the most favorable matchups possible, and Will Brennan was, frankly, quite bad when given a chance to start until late in the ALCS. So, he was grasping at straws here and after Schneemann put up some good, lengthy AB’s in game two of the ALCS, I tracked with his decisions. Might it have been better just to ride things out with Noel because he had the greatest potential to swing a game with one swing? Sure, maybe. But, I think there wasn’t a strong argument either way.
With the caveat that we are going to talk about one more hitter in a minute, I give Stephen Vogt an A- for pinch-hitting/lineup decisions.
Third Decision: Not Intentionally Walking Giancarlo Stanton in games 4 and 5 of the ALCS
Analysis: I think these two decisions are likely the ones that Vogt would most like to have back (despite his public assurances that he’d do the same thing if given the opportunity). With the Yankees clinging to a 3-2 lead, Cade Smith was clearly laboring with diminished velocity and control. With one out and runners on 2nd and 3rd, Vogt left his most dominant reliever in to face Giancarlo Stanton, right-on-right matchup. On paper, entirely defensible. With eyes on the game, it made little sense. It was time to either have Smith throw non-competitive pitches outside the zone to give Tim Herrin more time to warm up, or to just go get Herrin after an intentional walk to Stanton. You make Anthony Rizzo, Anthony Volpe and Austin Wells beat your best lefty here rather than force your clearly diminished reliever to try to right at a hitter who has demonstrated he can hit anyone in the playoffs and, when he does, it’s going over the fence. Vogt’s call was eminently defensible by the numbers – which would also defend not loading the bases! – but not at all defensible by the eyes which told us Smith absolutely did not have it and shouldn’t be asked to be his normal self; make of that what you will. Stanton made of it a three-run homer.
In contrast, having Tanner Bibee pitch to Giancarlo Stanton in the sixth inning of game five defied the numbers but showed a belief in eyes/heart. Now, I think something that is being drastically understated about this at-bat is that it is very clear that the intention was to either get a strikeout chase or issue an unintentional-intentional walk. Not a single one of the six pitches thrown in this at-bat were close to the strike zone until that final pitch that Stanton hit 117.5 mph (LOL). Bibee hung a slider he was supposed to (if you look at Naylor’s set-up) bury outside the zone. I think it is fair to say that Vogt should have just straight-up intentionally walked Stanton with two outs and pitched to Jazz Chisholm. I think this is even more justifiable than the previous scenario because Cade Smith was warm and Chisholm was far worse as a hitter in this series than Anthony Rizzo was (the player behind Stanton in game four). When you ask pitchers to issue these kind of walks, you put your player in a position to make a mistake. I think, if you gave him truth serum, Vogt would admit he wants to avoid doing that in the future. Would it have resulted in a 2-0 Cleveland win? I don’t know. None of us knows. But, I can’t quite convince myself the process was right here. Maybe you can, and that’s fine.
I’ve gotta give Vogt a D grade for these two decisions. These are the ones where, as he wisely said, you learn the lesson and leave the event, hoping you get a chance to put the lessons into practice someday.
Fourth Decision: Starting Alex Cobb
Analysis: In my opinion, it is purely hindsight for us to determine that Stephen Vogt should not have started Alex Cobb in the playoffs. Even if (as is the case for at least a couple commenters on Covering the Corner) you were calling for Gavin Williams over Alex Cobb because of Cobb’s history, you have to understand that IF the team believed Cobb was healthy enough to compete, he was 100% the right choice to start playoff games. Every statistic would back that up, as well as the healthy games we all saw Cobb throw this season.
Now, I do think it’s fair to wonder how much the team knew of Cobb’s physical condition being subpar. If they knew his hip and back were bothering him and gambled on him anyway, well, that’s a pretty silly decision because giving Gavin Williams a start in the ALDS could not have gone much worse than it went for injured Cobb and may have helped him shake off the rust that it took him an inning to discard against the Yankees in the ALCS. However, I suspect starting Cobb was an organizational decision not purely a Vogt call. So, I think we should fairly give Vogt a B- here, and suggest that in the future the team should bet on the healthy young arm over the broken down vet if given the chance.
Fifth Decision: Giving Fourteen Plate-Appearances to Austin Hedges
Analysis: I have pondered and pondered for a while now whether I can defend Hedges getting a bump in his plate appearance rate from 2.4% of the Guardians’ PA’s during the regular season to 3.6% of their PA’s during the postseason when it’s clear that percentage should have DECREASED with a championship on the line. I’ve tried to rationalize Hedges’ batting more than any other backup catcher in baseball has this postseason every which way I can. I am not convinced by the argument that Bo Naylor had a bad defensive game in game one of the ALCS. I am not convinced by the argument that Bo Naylor was not hitting any better over his last 50 at-bats than Hedges was. I don’t particularly care that Vogt was limited by David Fry’s elbow; while that’s true, it’s not like this was unexpected dynamic. Austin Hedges taking meaningful plate appearances for your team in a playoff series should be considered a fate worse than death. So, I understand and sympathize with Ben Clemens giving Vogt an F grade for his use of Hedges.
,,,However, I will give some grace that only Vogt was aware of just how exhausted Bo Naylor may have been after game one of the ALCS. Every reporter for the Guardians talked about Bo being absolutely ground into the dirt by his first year as a full-time catcher and he LOOKED exhausted during these playoffs… until he got more significant time off in games two and three of the ALCS. He came back and delivered good at-bats and timely hits in games four and five. I am going to charitably assume that Vogt believed his only chance at recovering the player Bo is capable of being was giving Hedges some more playing time. I think Vogt deserves that optimism from us because he did limit Hedges to under 150 plate appearances during the regular season; he displayed much more awareness than Tito Francona did that Hedges should not be considered as a major league hitter.
So, I’ll give Vogt a C grade in this area. I see what you were going for here, Vogter; just don’t let it happen again.
Final Grade:
I give Vogt a solid B- grade for his performance in the playoffs (I am including the full picture, not simply these five highlighted areas). There are spots in which he and the team need to improve. However, if you are intimately aware of the trajectory of the Guardians’ season and the particular challenges the Guardians faced in both the ALDS and ALCS, his decisions make a lot more sense than they do in the vaccuum in which national writers are often forced to make these evaluations. I’ll also note that it is not Vogt’s fault that his stars – Clase, Jose Ramirez and Josh Naylor – generally failed to deliver in big moments. He set them up to do what they did all season, and, for whatever reasons (bad luck/sequencing, poor execution, exhaustion, opponents just executing perfectly, etc), they generally failed to do so.
I am entirely confident Vogt will do some useful reflecting and make even better decisions if given future playoff opportunities.